Competition Schedule

Break

⌛️

Location: Ballroom

Location: Workshop 2 room located in Community Room

Location: Podcast recording studio in Salle de la commune

Prevent First, Detect Second: An Open-Source Approach

Capacity: 45

Workshops are first-come, first-serve and have limited capacity. Some workshops may be streamed for additional passive participation.

As the authors of this talk can testify from experience, it feels almost impossible to detect cyberattacks, let alone stop them. Alert fatigue and a shortage of automation, skills, and personnel further exacerbate this problem, emphasizing the need for prevention mechanisms that allow defenders time to investigate threats.

Incident response, even if automated, is best done after an attack has already been thwarted. Easier said than done? Not really if you use the right tools!

The right tools we will discuss in this talk are our open-source RPC-Firewall and LDAP-Firewall. First, we prevent! We show how these tools can be used in every Microsoft domain environment to halt innumerable attacks throughout the kill chain. We can stop the initial stages of an attack by preventing domain enumerations via SharpHound, BloodHound.py, SOAPHound, and various LDAP queries. We can also prevent numerous types of privilege escalation and lateral movement attacks, including DCSync attacks, remote DCOM execution, PsExec, PetitPotam attacks, Coercing attacks, and many more…

Second, we detect! Our open-source tools write Windows events to the local event logs, which can be easily forwarded to your local SIEM. The RPC Firewall and LDAP Firewall also have their own Sigma rules published for them, making detection engineering even simpler. Using Sentinel as an example, we show how these events can be ingested into any SIEM, how baselines can be easily created, and how detection rules are formulated.

Finally, we will summarize with RPC and LDAP firewall internals, which will help guide the security community on how to better contribute, expand, and customize these open-source tools to bring more value to the community.

Dekel Paz ,

Security Researcher with over 15 years of experience in Cybersecurity and software development. I’ve been on both sides of the fence – leading Offensive and Defensive security teams in the past.

Sagie VP Research, ZeroNetworks

Sagie is a defensive security researcher, leading the Zero-Labs team as VP of Research @ Zero Networks. With a bachelor's in Electrical-Engineer, Sagie started out designing and breaking-up communication schemas in the Intelligence unit of the military. After his service, Sagie went on to perform research on diverse topics, introducing new attacks techniques such as the "man-in-the-cloud" attacks and supply chain compromises against container developers. In recent years, Sagie is focused on research that delivers practical solutions to security teams, mainly in the form of open source security tools.

Location: Workshop 2 room located in Community Room

How crypto gets broken (by you)

Capacity: 45

Workshops are first-come, first-serve and have limited capacity. Some workshops may be streamed for additional passive participation.

This is an introduction to crypto: building blocks, protocols and attacks on them. We cover: encoding vs encryption, hashes, ‘classic’ crypto, stream ciphers, block ciphers, symmetric crypto, asymmetric crypto, has attacks, classic crypto attacks, stream cipher attack, block cipher attack models, ECB attacks, crypto protocols, digital signatures, message authentication code, nonces, simple authentication, challenge response, simple authentication attacks (key collisions, key extraction and extension, replay, valet, bad counter resync), MAC attacks, digital signature attacks, pubkey substitution, challenge response attacks (middleperson attack, UDS style seed-key predictions), WPA2 password cracking, WPA2 key reinstallation, WPA2 key nulling, TLS/SSL middleperson attacks, SWEET32, DROWN, logjam, POODLE, UDS seed-key exchange attacks (reverse key algorithm, lift key algorithm, solve for unknowns, retry-retry-retry, brute force, glitch past).

Tools covered include: rumkin.com, hashcat, john the ripper, binwalk, radare2, binvis.io, Veles, airocrack-ng, mitmproxy, MITMf.

The workshop is a ‘101’ level: geared for people good at computers but maybe no knowledge of cryptography. There will be minimal math (I promise). We’ll talk mostly about how to break bad crypto and bad crypto algorithms with 10-15min hands-on sessions integrated into 4 hours of workshop: Decrypt ‘Crypto’, Break Hashes, Break Crypto, Visualize Crypto.

We will explore three applications of the building blocks and attacks also. Towards the end we tie-in the building blocks and attacks into how the following crypto protocols get broken: WPA2, TLS and UDS Seed-Key exchange (from automotive). Please join us for an intro-level exploration of cryptography building blocks, protocols and how to attack them. And, as always, crypto means cryptography.

Ben Gardiner , Yellow Flag Security Inc.

Mr. Gardiner is an independent consultant at Yellow Flag Security, Inc. presently working to secure commercial transportation at the NMFTA and connected transportation with TMNA. With more than ten years of professional experience in embedded systems design and a lifetime of hacking experience, Gardiner has a deep knowledge of the low-level functions of operating systems and the hardware with which they interface. Prior to YFS Inc., Mr. Gardiner held security assurance and reversing roles at a global corporation, as well as worked in embedded software and systems engineering roles at several organizations. He holds a M.Sc. Eng. in Applied Math & Stats from Queen’s University. He is a DEF CON Hardware Hacking Village (DC HHV) and Car Hacking Village (CHV) volunteer. He is GIAC GPEN certified and a GIAC advisory board member, he is also chair of the SAE TEVEES18A1 Cybersecurity Assurance Testing TF (drafting J3061-2), contributor to several ATA TMC task forces, ISO WG11 committees, and a voting member of the SAE Vehicle Electronic Systems Security Committee. Mr. Gardiner has delivered workshops and presentations at several world cybersecurity events including the Cybertruck Challenge, GENIVI security sessions, Hack in Paris, HackFest and DEF CON main stage.

Location: Workshop 1 room located between Vieux-Montreal hall and Ville-Marie room

Enregistrement du podcast PolySécure

PolySécure est un podcast francophone sur la cybersécurité qui s'adresse aux professionels et curieux depuis 2020.

Le podcast se sépare en six grands segments:

Curieux: Segment destiné au grand public, afin de vulgariser des sujets pointus et qui peuvent sembler hermétique
PME: Segment pour les petites et moyennes entreprises, où les défis de cybersécurité sont existants, mais où les ressources sont limitées
 Professionnel: Segment pour ceux qui œuvrent dans le domaine de la cybersécurité ou dans un domaine connexe
Teknik: Segment pour ceux qui désire approfondir des sujets pointus en cybersécurité
Juridik: Segment abordant les questions juridiques (rappel, nous ne donnons pas de conseil juridique, veuillez consulter votre avocat pour une opinion juridique) qui affectent l'univers des technologies et de la cybersécurité. Nous y abordons régulièrement des sujets relatifs à la vie privée et aux lois qui la protège.
H'umain: Segment qui place l'humain au centre des préoccupations, puisque celui-ci n'est pas le maillon faible, mais le maillon fort de la cybersécurité.

Tous les épisodes et notes de recherche se trouvent à polysecure.ca

Location: Podcast recording studio in Salle de la commune

Malware Q&A

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This is a Q&A session. Moderators will take audience questions both remotely and on-site via sli.do.

Q&A Discussion for the malware block.

Sergei Frankoff Director, OpenAnalysis Inc

Sergei is a co-founder of OpenAnalysis Inc, and part of the team behind UnpacMe. When he is not reverse engineering malware Sergei is focused on building automation tools for malware analysis, and producing tutorials for the OALABS YouTube channel. With over a decade in the security industry Sergei has extensive experience working at the intersection of incident response and threat intelligence.

Alexandre Côté Malware Researcher, ESET

Alexandre is a malware researcher at ESET since 2021. Working with the Montreal team, his research is focused on tracking APT groups and their toolsets.

He has previously presented about APTs and attribution at Botconf, Sleuthcon, Hackfest, and BSidesMTL. He is also involved in mentoring students getting started in infosec. His interests include operating systems fundamentals, writing shell scripts to automate tasks that don't always need to be automated, and brewing beer.

Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé Senior Malware Researcher, ESET

Marc-Etienne is a malware researcher at ESET since 2012. He specializes in malware attacking unusual platforms, whether it’s fruity hardware or software from south pole birds. Marc-Etienne focused his research on the reverse engineering of server-side malware to discover their inner working and operation strategy. His research led to the publication of the Operation Windigo white paper that won Virus Bulletin’s Péter Szőr Award for best research paper in 2014. He presented at multiple conferences including RSAC, FIRST, 44con, CARO and Linuxcon Europe. When he’s not one of the organizer, he loves participating in CTF competitions like a partying gentleman. Outside the cyberspace, Marc-Etienne plays the clarinet and read comics.

Marc-Etienne est chercheur en logiciels malveillants chez ESET depuis 2012. Il se spécialise dans les logiciels qui ciblent les plateformes inhabituelles, comme les ordinateurs avec des pommes ou des pingouins. Durant les dernières années, Marc-Etienne s'est concentré sur la rétro-ingénierie de logiciels malveillants s'attaquant aux serveurs, à la fois pour comprendre leurs fonctionnements et comment ils sont utilisés. Ses recherches ont mené à la publication du rapport Operation Windigo qui s'est mérité le prix Péter Szőr Award à Virus Bulletin pour meilleur rapport de recherche en 2014. Il a présenté à de multiples conférences incluant RSAC, FIRST, 44con, CARO Workshop et Linuxcon Europe. Quand il n'est pas dans le comité organisateur, il aime participer à des compétitions de sécurité (CTF) comme un gentilhomme en fête. En dehors du cyberespace, Marc-Etienne joue de la clarinette et lit des bandes dessineés.

Alexis Dorais-Joncas APT Research Manager, Proofpoint

Alexis Dorais-Joncas is the Senior Manager of Proofpoint’s APT research team, where he and his team of threat researchers and intelligence analysts focus on tracking the most elusive state-sponsored threat actors and ensuring Proofpoint customers are protected against these persistent attackers. Prior to joining Proofpoint, Alexis led ESET’s Montreal-based R&D branch office for over 10 years, where his team focused on malware research, network security and targeted attacks tracking. Alexis is an established speaker on current cyberthreats, having spoken in front of diverse audiences at events such as Northsec, Bluehat, Botconf, First CTI, Sector and Rightscon. He has also been quoted in several security and technical media such as Wired, ITWorldCanada and Ars Technica, with broadcast appearances on Radio-Canada and Skynews. Alexis holds an M. Sc. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Sherbrooke in Canada.

Greg Lesnewich ,

Greg Lesnewich is a Senior Threat Researcher at Proofpoint, focused on identifying, tracking, detecting, and disrupting malicious activity linked to North Korea and Russia. Greg has a background in threat intelligence, incident response, and managed detection, previously working at Recorded Future, Leidos, and NCFTA, with experience in developing methods of tracking espionage and state-sponsored activity. Greg enjoys the topics of weird forensic artifacts, measuring malware similarity, YARA, and infrastructure tracking.

Pierre-Marc Bureau ,

Location: Ville-Marie Hall

Ebury, 10 years in: The evolution of a sophisticated Linux server threat

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

In 2014, we published a paper about Operation Windigo, where we described a cluster of server-side threats fuelled by Ebury, a backdoor and credential stealer injected into the OpenSSH server and client of compromised servers. That report shed light on web traffic redirections, delivery of Windows malware, and spam campaigns, all using Ebury-compromised servers.

After the arrest and extradition of one of the perpetrators in 2015, some of the monetization activities temporarily stopped, but not all of the botnet’s activities. Ebury continued to be updated and deployed to tens of thousands of servers each year, to reach a cumulative total of nearly 400,000 victims since 2009, the first year Ebury was seen. Moreover, we have discovered its operators have added more tools to their arsenal, such as Apache modules to exfiltrate HTTP requests or proxy traffic, Linux kernel modules to perform traffic redirections, and modified Netfilter tools to inject and hide firewall rules.

For this investigation we set up honeypots to collect Ebury samples and understand deployment tactics, and partnered with law enforcement. This gave us unique visibility into the perpetrators’ activities, which expanded to include cryptocurrency theft and possibly exfiltration of credit card details. We now have a better understanding of how they expand their botnet not only by stealing credentials, but also by actively trying to compromise the hosting provider’s infrastructure to deploy malware on all of the providers’ customer-rented servers. In some cases, this resulted in the compromise of tens of thousands of servers, hosting millions of domains.

The latest update to Ebury, versioned 1.8.2, was first seen in January 2024. In the past years, clever userland rootkit functionalities were added to Ebury, which make its detection a lot more difficult than before. From a system administrator’s perspective, not only is the malware file absent, but none of the resources it uses – such as processes, sockets, and mapped memory – are listed when inspecting the system.

This presentation not only reveals the latest toolset of the Ebury gang, but also discusses detection techniques to protect against some of the trickiest Linux threats. Some techniques are specific to Ebury, but most apply to the detection of any userland rootkit.

Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé Senior Malware Researcher, ESET

Marc-Etienne is a malware researcher at ESET since 2012. He specializes in malware attacking unusual platforms, whether it’s fruity hardware or software from south pole birds. Marc-Etienne focused his research on the reverse engineering of server-side malware to discover their inner working and operation strategy. His research led to the publication of the Operation Windigo white paper that won Virus Bulletin’s Péter Szőr Award for best research paper in 2014. He presented at multiple conferences including RSAC, FIRST, 44con, CARO and Linuxcon Europe. When he’s not one of the organizer, he loves participating in CTF competitions like a partying gentleman. Outside the cyberspace, Marc-Etienne plays the clarinet and read comics.

Marc-Etienne est chercheur en logiciels malveillants chez ESET depuis 2012. Il se spécialise dans les logiciels qui ciblent les plateformes inhabituelles, comme les ordinateurs avec des pommes ou des pingouins. Durant les dernières années, Marc-Etienne s'est concentré sur la rétro-ingénierie de logiciels malveillants s'attaquant aux serveurs, à la fois pour comprendre leurs fonctionnements et comment ils sont utilisés. Ses recherches ont mené à la publication du rapport Operation Windigo qui s'est mérité le prix Péter Szőr Award à Virus Bulletin pour meilleur rapport de recherche en 2014. Il a présenté à de multiples conférences incluant RSAC, FIRST, 44con, CARO Workshop et Linuxcon Europe. Quand il n'est pas dans le comité organisateur, il aime participer à des compétitions de sécurité (CTF) comme un gentilhomme en fête. En dehors du cyberespace, Marc-Etienne joue de la clarinette et lit des bandes dessineés.

Location: Ville-Marie Hall

Redefining Digital Security: A New Approach for IPV Victims

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

This presentation, informed by a collaborative research project led by CDEACF, the Alliance des Maisons 2e Étape and the Lab-2038, addresses the critical need for specialized digital privacy strategies in support of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) victims. Rather than looking at what advices security experts can give to IPV victims, we investigate how user experience, security settings and data governance pratices can directly impact their digital and physical safety. Our research highlights how generic, one-size-fits-all threat modelling and security policies by providers, including internet service providers, can inadvertently burden IPV victims. The talk emphasizes the importance of developing nuanced, victim-centred digital security approaches that acknowledge the unique challenges faced by IPV victims. It advocates for a collaborative effort among service providers, technologists, and social welfare experts to create more sensitive and effective digital privacy solutions tailored to the needs of IPV victims.

Corinne Pulgar Project manager, Lab2038

Corinne Pulgar brings a unique blend of technical expertise and social awareness to the field of digital security. With a Master's in Software Engineering from École de Technologie Supérieure (ETS) and a Bachelor's in Computer Science from Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), they possess a deep understanding of software development and security. They have shown a steadfast commitment to education through their contributions as a project manager and InfoSec at Lab2038 and a teaching assistant and lecturer at multiple institutions, including McGill University, ETS and UQAM. Her ability to translate complex technical concepts into accessible knowledge has made them a sought-after lecturer and mentor.

Corinne’s research, presented at conferences and published in journals, focuses on model-driven software engineering and DevOps, demonstrating their innovative approach to software development. Their work at the intersection of technology and inclusivity reflects their dedication to leveraging their technical expertise for social good, specifically in enhancing digital privacy and security for vulnerable groups. Their unique perspective, combining technical acumen with a passion for social impact, makes them an ideal speaker to address the critical issue of digital privacy in the context of IPV.

Location: Ville-Marie Hall

GraphRunner and Defending Your Microsoft Tenant

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

For organizations using Microsoft Entra ID (formerly known as Azure Active Directory) and O365, it’s fairly well understood that a set of default logs are readily available for use, no matter what log management tooling an organization is using. However, this standard logging has its limits.

Last fall, the team at Black Hills Information Security released a post exploitation kit called GraphRunner. This tool is focused on interacting with the Microsoft Graph API, which is the backbone that services Entra ID, O365 and many other services in the Microsoft cloud. The release of GraphRunner and future tools like it streamlines a number of activities that an adversary would perform after gaining access, making it simpler for anyone to use. While GraphRunner is a post exploitation toolkit, there are authentication functions that highlight how adversaries could use the OAuth authorization code flow to their advantage.

As a defender, this presents a set of challenges. Less sophisticated adversaries have a lower barrier to entry once they have gained access to the Graph API than they did before. It also highlights that the standard logging may not be sufficient to gain visibility into actions like the refreshing of tokens or other activities that a tool like GraphRunner provides.

This talk is designed to provide insight into additional data sets that Microsoft cloud users have access to but may not be as widely deployed. These additional data sets can provide defenders additional insight, detect suspicious activity and can serve as a hunting ground when confronted with an adversary using techniques like those found in GraphRunner.

Because GraphRunner contains numerous modules and is written in PowerShell, an adversary can customize it to their own needs. While we won’t be able to cover all possible permutations, our goal is to identify data sets and events that can assist defenders while using GraphRunner as a representative of the kinds of methods that adversaries might use.

Attendees will come away from this talk with: -A greater understanding of GraphRunner and its capabilities -Awareness of the logging available for the Graph API beyond the standard logging -Ideas around how detections and hunts can be designed to identify GraphRunner activity

John Stoner Security Strategist, Google Cloud

John Stoner is a Global Principal Security Strategist at Google Cloud and leverages his experience to improve users' capabilities in Security Operations, Threat Hunting, Incident Response, Detection Engineering and Threat Intelligence. He blogs on threat hunting and security operations and has built multiple APT threat emulations for blue team capture the flag events. John has presented and led workshops at various industry symposia including FIRST (CTI, Tech Colloquium), BSides (SF, Las Vegas), SANS Summits (DFIR, Threat Hunting, Cloud and SIEM), WiCyS, Way West Hacking Fest, AISA and DefCon Packet Hacking Village. He also enjoys listening to what his former teammates referred to as "80s sad-timey music."

Location: Ballroom

Heartbleed, ten years later

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

This year marks the ten-year anniversary of Heartbleed’s discovery and public disclosure. Heartbleed was a severe flaw in the OpenSSL cryptographic library. It was publicly disclosed on April 7, 2014, initiating a long and arduous process of remediation for more than two thirds of all web servers on the internet. Anybody could potentially eavesdrop on communications, steal data or impersonate users for any vulnerable service or device, without leaving a trace. Described by some experts as “one of the most consequential vulnerability since the advent of the commercial internet”, Heartbleed abruptly unveiled the insecure and unsustainable foundations on which the internet infrastructure was built. How could so many major organizations (Google, Amazon, Facebook, financial and government institutions) depend on OpenSSL, a struggling free software project with one overworked full-time developer and $2,000 in yearly donations? How could they integrate its code without any proper security audit or reciprocal financial support? This presentation traces the historical roots of the OpenSSL project and its growing adoption, from the mid 1990s up to 2014. Based on original interviews with OpenSSL developers and security experts as well as extensive archival research, it portrays a nascent cryptographic library written “as a learning exercise” during the turmoil of the Crypto Wars of the 1990s. Finally, this presentation explores some of the long-lasting effects Heartbleed has had on the tech industry and free software community – effects that still resonate to this day, ten years later.

Louis Melançon ,

Titulaire d’une maîtrise en mobilisation et transfert des connaissances de l’Institut national de la recherche scientifique, Louis a toujours cherché à combiner son intérêt pour le transfert des connaissances à sa passion pour la recherche et l’impact des nouvelles technologies. Après avoir poursuivi ses études universitaires en s’intéressant à la vulnérabilité Heartbleed et son impact sur les pratiques de sécurité, Louis a collaboré avec plusieurs organismes de mobilisation des connaissances tels que Serene-risc et Research Impact Canada. Ayant récemment joint l’équipe du soutien à la recherche chez Ivado, cette présentation est l’occasion pour Louis de revisiter le sujet qui l’a passionné pendant des années.

Holder of a master's degree in knowledge mobilization from INRS, Louis has always sought to combine his interest in knowledge transfer with his passion for research and the impact of new technologies. After continuing his university studies focusing on the Heartbleed vulnerability and its impact on security practices, Louis collaborated with several knowledge mobilization organizations such as Serene-risc and Research Impact Canada. Having recently joined the research support team at Ivado, this presentation is an opportunity for Louis to revisit the subject that has fascinated him for years.

Location: Ballroom

Real or fake? Tools to fight online disinformation

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

It is quite challenging to verify the origin of online content. In this era of disinformation exacerbated by ever-evolving AI tools, the creation of seemingly authentic fake accounts and content can be quite dangerous, with risks ranging from harming one’s reputation to damaging society as a whole. Fortunately, content provenance technologies are emerging to fight this problem. The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) is the leading effort allowing creators to cryptographically sign their digital assets and record subsequent edits helping consumers to confirm their origin and authenticity while keeping an auditable history of the data transformations. It has been adopted by leading technology providers (Microsoft, Google, Meta), camera manufacturers (Sony, Nikon), image/video editors (Adobe), generative AI companies (OpenAI, Midjourney), and news organizations (BBC, CBC/Radio-Canada, New York Times). C2PA is also at the forefront of the fight against election disinformation, and was one of two technologies mentioned in the recent AI Elections accord signed at the Munich security conference. In this presentation, I’ll describe the C2PA use cases, specifications, and the lifecycle of a protected digital asset (such as images, videos, and audio clips) from their creation, to their modifications and validation. I’ll present open-source tools/SDKs that anyone can use to create and verify protected content or integrate this functionality in their applications and services. I’ll also present the Cross-Platform Origin of Content (XPOC) framework allowing content owners to create authoritative lists of their social media accounts and content, addressing a slightly different provenance problem. I’ll give a demonstration of the open-source tools allowing anyone to self-host and verify XPOC manifests.

Christian Paquin Principal Research Software Engineer, Microsoft

I’m cryptography and security engineer at Microsoft Research where I aim to bring new research innovations closer to reality. My work focuses lately on privacy-preserving identity, post-quantum cryptography, and content origin and authentication (especially surrounding the work of the C2PA in which I’m a member of the technical working group). Prior to joining Microsoft I was a crypto developer at Zero Knowledge Systems developing a TOR-precursor mixnet and the Chief Security Engineer at Credentica.

Location: Ville-Marie Hall

Double Trouble: Unmasking Twin Phishing Campaigns Targeting E-commerce and Travel Sites

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Talks will be streamed on YouTube and Twitch for free.

In today's technology-driven landscape, the transition to digital transactions has eclipsed conventional face-to-face interactions, presenting novel challenges in ensuring transaction security. Users, perhaps inadvertently, heighten security risks by opening email attachments from phishing attempts, intensifying the complexities of online transaction security. Moreover, there exists the potential of voluntarily disclosing sensitive information, further adding intricacy to the digital transaction security landscape.

Compounding this issue, cyber attacks leverage customer data pilfered from compromised merchants. Victims find themselves coerced into divulging credit card details through a sophisticated, multi-step process. This research brings to light a new phishing campaign, unraveling the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and indicators of compromise (IoCs) employed by threat actors. These encompass the exploitation of the platform's chat function and the incorporation of transaction data to bolster the credibility of phishing pages.

The cyber attacks, though strikingly similar, employ urgent language and intimate knowledge of users' bookings, instilling credibility in deceitful messages. However, distinctive cues like odd URLs and typos serve as saviors for potential victims. Upon analysis, these campaigns redirect users to counterfeit sites that mirror legitimate e-commerce platforms. The craftiness of cyber criminals shines through identical HTML elements and scripts, meticulously validating data and even circumventing multi-factor authentication.

Further investigation unveils the tactics employed by cyber thieves: exploiting InfoStealer malware to breach hotel chat systems and amass valuable customer data, escalating their targeted attacks. Open-source intelligence tools reveal a broader scope, a twin campaign where attackers impersonating various platforms, not limited to travel sites but also other e-commerce platforms, since 2021. Domain fronting is also consistently employed to conceal their tracks along with some other TTPs.

The research culminates in insights and recommendations to enhance the security of all parties involved. By implementing these suggestions, it is hoped that both platforms and merchant-customers can fortify their resilience, mitigating potential risks in the dynamic digital landscape.

Mangatas Tondang (@tas_kmanager) Security Researcher, Microsoft / Curated Intelligence

Tas has spent the last five years immersed in the worlds of threat hunting, detection engineering, and security research. Currently, he's making changes at Microsoft, specializing in cloud security research. Beyond his professional endeavors, Tas is a passionate contributor to the cybersecurity community, holding roles in the DFIR report and Curated Intelligence. He's also no stranger to the stage, having presented at various conferences around the globe, to name a few SANS Summits and DEF CON BTV. When he's not navigating the digital landscape, Tas enjoys the art of astrophotography and embarking on spontaneous adventures across the globe exploring landscapes and cuisines.

Location: Ballroom

May 17 2024

Capture-The-Flag Rooms

CTF Salle de Bal Registration / Enregistrement

CTF Salle de la commune Registration / Enregistrement

The CTF Begins // Ouverture du CTF

CTF Day 1 // Competition Jour 1

May 18 2024

Capture-The-Flag Rooms

Ouverture de la compétition jour 2 // CTF Opening Day 2

CTF Day 2 // Compétition jour 2

Hacker Jeopardy

Post-Jeopardy Pizza!

CTF Day 2 (cont.) // Compétition jour 2 (suite)

May 19 2024

Capture-The-Flag Rooms

CTF Day 3 // Compétition jour 3

CTF Closing Ceremony // Cérémonie de clotûre du CTF